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Abstract
We examine the regulations for managing pest resistance to pesticide variety in a
spatially-explicit analytical framework. We compare the performance of the EPA's
mandatory refuges and a tax on pesticide variety under several biological assump-
tions on pest mobility and farmer's pest vulnerability. We ¯nd that the tax tends to
be more e±cient if farmers are su±ciently heterogeneous with regard to their pest
vulnerability within the area in which pests move. On the other hand, the refuge is
more e±cient for low pest mobility or if each farmer's impact on his own pest resis-
tance is negligible. Our result sheds light on the choice of regulatory instruments
for common-pool resource regulations where spatial localization matters.
JEL classi¯cation: Q16, Q18, D62.
Keywords: pest resistance, pesticides, transgenic crop, tax, refuge, spatial, externalities.
1 Introduction
Resistance to pest damage is embedded in some crop varieties, which thereby have an
economic advantage over their conventional non-resistant counterparts. But this advan-
tage may be lost over time, as selection pressure causes pest populations to adapt to this
resistance. A similar phenomenon is the erosion of the e±cacy of chemical pesticides as
pests become immune to them. Natural resistances have always existed in crop varieties,
and some of them are selected deliberately through conventional crop breeding. The ¯eld
of pest resistance management has received new and increased scrutiny with the advent
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1of insect-resistant genetically modi¯ed crops, in which resistance to one major target
pest (or more recently two pests) has been inserted through genetic engineering.
To date, all commercialized insect-resistant transgenic crops have obtained this re-
sistance through the insertion and expression of the toxins of a soil bacterium, Bacillus
Thuringiensis (Bt). Commercialization of these crops in the United States has raised
concerns about adaptation build-up, especially among environmentalist groups, because
organic farmers use Bt sprays for pest control. Largely due to active pressure by these
groups, but also to the involvement of scientists calling for regulation, the large-scale
adoption of Bt crops in the United States has been accompanied by the most impressive
mandatory system ever developed for pest resistance management (EPA 2001, Bour-
guet et al. 2005). In 1995 for Bt cotton and in 2000 for Bt corn, the US Environmental
Protection Agency has demanded that all farmers growing a Bt crop devote a given per-
centage of their farm surface to a non-GM non-insect-resistant variety. These non-GM
areas are called refuges. They are designed to maintain a pool of susceptible insects to
delay the buildup of adaptation to Bt crops in target insect populations. The regulation
speci¯es the size of the refuge and a maximal distance between Bt and refuge ¯elds.
This mandatory refuge system has been motivated by a market failure due to the fact
that pest resistance is a common-pool resource exploited under open access by farmers.
As pointed out by the earlier literature on pest resistance to chemical pesticides (Hueth
and Regev 1974, Regev et al. 1983, Lazarus and Dixon 1984, Clark and Carlson 1990,
Bromley 1990)1, the use of pesticides (or, equivalently, what we call pesticide varieties
such as Bt corn) has two impacts on farmers' pro¯t. The ¯rst is the immediate bene¯t
due to the reduction of the pest population and, therefore, of pest damages. It is
individual since each farmer enjoys the bene¯t of pesticides applied on his own ¯eld.
The second is the future decrease of susceptibility to the pesticide (chemical or variety)
in the pest population, which reduces its bene¯cial use. For the latter impact, since pests
are mobile on larger scales than single farms (which is the case for all target pests of Bt
crops), pest susceptibility is a common-pool resource shared by all farmers in the area.
Since the bene¯ts of pesticides are individual but the costs in term of future development
of pest resistance are collective, the market provides farmers with incentives to over-use
pesticides. Hence, there is scope for regulation to improve crop production e±ciency.
It is not however clear that a uniform mandatory refuge is the best regulatory in-
strument to manage pest resistance. The literature on common-pool resources and
environmental regulation stresses that market-based regulations such as taxes and sub-
sidies or tradable emissions permits are more e±cient when agents (e.g. farmers) are
heterogeneous. The reason is that market forces tend to assign the costs of reducing
1See Miranowski and Carlson (1986) for a review and discussion on this literature.
2pollution or resource over-use to the more e±cient agents (see e.g. Baumol and Oates
1998, Kolstad 2000). In the case of pesticide use, di®erent farmers usually face di®erent
pest vulnerabilities. A tax on pesticides would assign the reduction of pesticide use
mostly to farmers less vulnerable to pest attacks.
However, a particular feature of pest resistance management mitigates this usual
preference for market-based instruments: pest mobility is limited, because a pest is
more likely to move to ¯elds close by than to those far away. In other words, pest
susceptibility is a common-pool resource that is scattered unevenly in the crop ¯elds.
This spatial externality among farmers implies that conventional variety ¯elds should
be located close enough to pesticide ¯elds to serve as a refuge. Therefore, not only the
costs and bene¯ts of pesticide use matter for an e±cient pest resistance management,
but also the localization of pesticide use. The desirable localization of resource use is
not necessarily linked with the value of this resource, and therefore is not necessarily
implemented with market-based instruments. For instance, if all farmers whose oppor-
tunity cost to give up pesticide use were located in the same place, a tax on the pesticide
variety would concentrate conventional ¯elds close to one another, far away from the
pesticide ¯elds. Therefore, pests originating from those conventional ¯elds would hardly
cross with resistant pests emerging from pesticide crops since they would have a low
probability of reaching them. In that case, a \command-and-control" regulation that
restricts these places in which pest susceptibility is extracted, such as mandatory refuges,
might be more appropriate. In this context, the aim of this paper is to compare the
e±ciency of the two aforementioned regulatory instruments, i.e. a mandatory refuge
and a tax on pesticide variety, to mitigate the development of pest resistance, under
several assumptions on pest mobility and farm heterogeneity.
The advent of Bt crops and the adoption of the refuge policy in the US have triggered
a wave of studies and research on pest resistance management (see Hurley 2006 for a
review). The ¯rst involvement of economists in the design of this policy has been to
provide calibrated simulations, in collaboration with population biologists, in order to
determine economically optimal refuge sizes (Hurley et al. 2001, Hurley et al. 2002)
and the costs of alternative refuge con¯gurations (Hyde et al. 2001). This initial work
has been extended in various directions. Laxminarayan and Simpson (2002) examine
how the optimal refuge size should change over time. Livingston et al. (2004) posit a
simulation model for examining Bt resistance and insecticide resistance together, and
assessing the e®ect of spraying refuges with insecticides or not. Mitchell et al. (2002)
examine the e®ects of several incentive instruments to secure grower compliance with
the uniform refuge requirement: a refuge insurance potentially coupled with a subsidy, a
direct refuge subsidy along with inspection and return of the subsidy by non-compliant
3growers, a mandatory insurance or a combination of ¯nes and monitoring. Frisvold and
Reeves (2006) show how providing multiple refuge options (e.g. a large refuge sprayed
with a chemical pesticide versus a small unsprayed refuge) reduces regulatory costs.
The choice of the instrument itself was ¯rst questioned by Secchi and Babcock (2003).
The authors apply a dynamic and spatially explicit simulation model calibrated on Bt
corn to show that non-Bt ¯elds planted near Bt ¯elds signi¯cantly delay the resistance
buildup, even with low levels of insect mobility across ¯elds. They argue that if pest
mobility is high enough, tradable refuges between neighbors may be superior to in-¯eld
mandatory refuges, although they do not analyze this alternative regulation in their
simulations. In addition, they do not consider the impact of pest resistance regulations
on farmers' variety choice since this choice is exogenous in their simulation. The present
paper ¯lls this gap by comparing the impact of mandatory refuges and a tax (which has
the same °avor as tradable refuges) with endogenous farmers' variety choice.
In the same vein as Secchi and Babcock, Vacher et al. (2006) also use simulations
and push the analysis further by making growers' variety choices endogenous, and by
considering a fee on the Bt seed as an alternative to refuges, to decrease Bt areas and
therefore delay the evolution of resistance. However, they assume that farmers are
myopic, in the sense that they do not consider their own impact on pest resistance.
In contrast, in this paper each farmer takes into account how his own actions a®ect
resistance development. In Vacher et al. (2006) as in our paper, farmers are sorted
geographically and face heterogeneous pest attacks. The fee strategy alone, in the
absence of mandatory refuges, leads to a spatial segregation of Bt and conventional
corn. Whether the non-Bt area serves as a natural refuge for the Bt area and contains
the evolution of resistance depends on pest dispersal between the two patches and on
the heterogeneity between farmers. The simulations in Vacher et al. (2006) suggest
that the fee strategy alone would not work for Bt corn in the US Cornbelt, but could
dominate the refuge strategy for a smaller and more heterogeneous ecosystem.
The present paper tackles the same issue as Vacher et al. (2006), using a di®erent
methodology. We design a spatially-explicit model of crop production with pest resis-
tance in which farmers make crop variety choices. Instead of relying on simulations on
calibrated dynamic models which lack of generality and transparency in the mechanisms
at play, we use a stylized representation of the problem from which we are able to de-
rive analytical solutions. We analyze the impact of two key parameters pointed out in
Vacher et al. (2006): pest mobility and farm heterogeneity. Depending on the levels of
these parameters, we assess whether a refuge or a tax on Bt seed can restore e±ciency
and, if not, how each of these instruments performs in managing the evolution of pest
resistance.
4Our approach is more in line with the mainstream environmental regulation litera-
ture, which attempts to design instruments that decentralize the e±cient outcome (e.g.
resource extraction or pollution reduction) in equilibrium. We ¯rst describe explic-
itly the e±cient localization and size of crop varieties: what we call the e±cient pest
resistance management strategy. We then examine under which assumptions on pest
mobility and farm heterogeneity a mandatory refuge or a tax on the pesticide variety
lead to the e±cient outcome in equilibrium. Next, we compare the performance of both
instruments when they lead to second-best outcomes in equilibrium, to establish how
the choice between the refuge and the tax varies when the degrees of pest dispersal and
farm heterogeneity vary.
Apart from pest resistance management, the paper contributes to the literature on
the choice of regulatory instruments when the spatial localization of the resource mat-
ters. Examples include ¯sheries, water, bio-diversity and pollution. For those resource
and environmental problems, the market-based instruments fail to implement the ¯rst-
best solution since the value of the resource is not necessarily related to its optimal
spatial distribution. For instance, protecting some animal or vegetal species requires
forest areas of speci¯c form and size. The private property of land does not necessarily
lead to forest areas of these forms and sizes (see Parkhurst and Shogren, 2005). For
¯sheries, the imperfect mobility of ¯sh species in the ocean might provide a rationale for
spatial enclosures such as marine reserves instead of tradable quotas or landing taxes
(Chakravorty and Nemoto, 2000; see Janmaat, 2005, for a review).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the optimal and equilibrium outcomes in the general case, that is, without any
speci¯c assumption on pest mobility and farmer's pest vulnerability. It shows that the
ine±ciency of the equilibrium outcome is due to pest mobility. The next two sections
analyze the decentralization of the e±cient outcome (pest resistance management) with
regulations under speci¯c assumptions on pest mobility and farmer's pest vulnerability.
Section 4 shows that a tax on the pesticide variety implements the e±cient outcome
if pests are perfectly mobile across ¯elds and if farmers have a negligible impact on
resistance. Section 5 shows that if farmers face same pest vulnerability then a refuge
implements the ¯rst-best. It can also be implemented with a tax but only if farmers
have a non-negligible impact on resistance. Section 6 compares the performance of
the two regulations under alternative assumptions on pest mobility and farmer's pest
vulnerability in implementing a second-best outcome.
52 Model
Although resistance build-up is a dynamic problem, we summarize the cumulated e®ect
of the use of the resistant variety over time in a one-period problem. Farmers make
their variety choice at the beginning of the period with rational expectations on future
pest resistance. They obtain their pro¯t at the end of the period. This short-cut allows
us to keep the model tractable, to focus on one important side of the problem that has
received less attention in previous papers: its spatial dimension.2
We rely on a spatially explicit framework in which we assume that farmers are
spatially sorted, from those who face the fewest pest attacks to those who face the most
(a sorting that could result from a climatic gradient). Due to pest mobility, resistance
at each location is in°uenced by crop choices at other locations. This formalization
allows us to capture the e®ect of pest dispersal in the long run when farmers make an
initial crop variety choice and stick to it. In addition, we abstract from other issues that
are of importance for pest resistance management but that appear less central for the
choice of instruments in the ¯rst place: for example, we do not consider the possibility
of applying a chemical pesticide on the non-resistant areas; nor do we consider strategic
behavior from seed suppliers (we keep the seed prices as exogenous).
We consider a set ­ of 2I ¡ 2 farmers facing heterogeneous pest attacks. Producers
are equidistant on a circle and located according to their ranking (i.e. for every i 2
f2;::;2I ¡ 3g, farmer i has neighbors i ¡ 1 and i + 1, and farmers 1 and 2I ¡ 2 are
neighbors). Farmer i faces an intensity of pest attacks ni. To avoid edge e®ects, we
assume that ni is non-decreasing in i on the ¯rst half of the circle (i.e. ni+1 ¸ ni for
every i 2 f1;:::;Ig), and non-increasing in i on the second half of the circle. Moreover,
we assume a symmetric distribution of ni on both halves of the circle (i.e. n2I¡i = ni
for every i 2 f2;:::;I ¡1g), with maxi2f1;:::;Ig ni = nI · 1. Each farmer has a ¯xed area
of land that is planted either with a pesticide variety or with a conventional variety that
shows no resistance to the pest considered.
In the absence of pest attacks, the unit pro¯t on the conventional variety is assumed
to be constant and normalized to 1. All pests survive and cause crop damage on the
conventional variety. Pro¯t losses caused by pest attacks of intensity ni are equal to ni.
The pesticide variety is available with an over-cost (or opportunity cost) c compared
to the conventional variety. Only resistant pests survive to cause crop damage on the
pesticide variety. The farmer's unit pro¯t at location i is:
¼i(xi;wi;ni;c) = xi(1 ¡ niwi ¡ c) + (1 ¡ xi)(1 ¡ ni); (1)
2The drawback is that we cannot analyze the dynamics of farmers' variety choices across time with
resistance build-up.
6where xi is the proportion of surface area planted with a pesticide variety and wi is the
average long-run proportion of resistant pests.3
The proportion of resistant pests on farm i depends on the other farmers' planting







where ±i¡j = ±j¡i captures the impact of farmer j's crop on resistance at i (±0 is the
e®ect of a farmer on his own resistance level) and ° quanti¯es the magnitude of resistance
development, with 0 < ° < 1. We assume ±0 = 1 and ±j · ±k for j < k. This assumption
implies that a farmer's impact on resistance at another location is decreasing with the
distance.4
A pest resistance management strategy (PRM) x = (x1;::::;x2I¡2) is a vector of
resistant area proportions (or variety choice) xi for every farmer i 2 ­. In what follows,
we successively examine the e±cient PRM strategy, denoted as x¤, and the equilibrium
PRM strategy in the absence of regulation, denoted as xe, in the general case. Then,
for speci¯c assumptions on pest dispersal and farm heterogeneity, we examine these two
strategies as well as the performance of two types of regulation, a mandatory refuge and
a uniform tax on the seeds of the resistant variety.
3 Optimal and equilibrium outcomes
In our set-up, total welfare is measured by the sum of pro¯ts from crop production.
Therefore, the socially optimal PRM strategy x¤ maximizes
P
i2­ ¼i(xi;wi;ni;c), sub-
ject 0 · xi · 1 to every i 2 ­. Denote ¸¤
i and ¹ ¸¤
i the multipliers associated with the
respective constraints xi ¸ 0 and xi · 1, for any i 2 ­. The optimal PRM strategy x¤
satis¯es the following ¯rst-order conditions:
ni(1 ¡ w¤
i) + ¸¤









3Immediate observation shows that: @¼i=@xi = ni(1 ¡ wi) ¡ c: all other things being equal, the
unit pro¯t level at location ni increases with the resistant area proportion if and only if the additional
number of pests that are controlled by the resistant technology, i.e. the number of susceptible pests,
ni(1 ¡ wi), is higher than the unit cost of the resistant technology, c. This unit pro¯t level decreases
with the level of resistance wi, as pest control then decreases on the resistant area. It decreases with
the intensity of pest attacks ni.
4At each location, choices of other farmers in°uence only resistance. We do not account for the fact
that choices made at other locations may also in°uence the intensity of pest attacks at each location
(pesticide plantings may decrease the whole pest population and therefore decrease the pest pressure at
each location, i.e. each ni could also be modelled a function of other farmers' planting strategies xj).
7for every i 2 ­. In (3), the marginal bene¯t of the pesticide variety (left-hand side) is
equalized to its marginal cost (right-hand side) net of the shadow costs of the constraints
at any location i. The marginal cost of pesticide variety includes the impact of i's area of
the pesticide variety on its own resistance level wi, formally @wi
@xi , as well as on resistance
levels wj of other farmers j 6= i, formally
@wj
@xi .
Let us now examine the equilibrium PRM strategy xe = (xe
1;:::xe
2I¡2) de¯ned as
the planting strategies selected by farmers in the Nash equilibrium without regulation.
Each farmer i maximizes his own pro¯t ¼i(xi;wi;ni;c) subject to 0 · xi · 1. Denoting
¸e
i and ¹ ¸e
i the multipliers associated with the respective constraints xi ¸ 0 and xi · 1,
the (only) solution xe
i, satis¯es the following ¯rst-order condition:
ni(1 ¡ we
i) + ¸e






According to (4), each farmer equalizes the marginal bene¯t of pesticide variety (left-
hand side) to its marginal cost (right-hand side) net of the shadow cost of the constraints.
However, since the farmer incurs only the cost of the PRM strategy on his own pro¯t, he
ignores the impact of his PRM strategy on his neighbor's pro¯ts. Therefore, in contrast
to the optimal PRM strategy, the right-hand term in (4) includes only the impact of i's
PRM strategy on his pro¯t, not on the other farmers' pro¯ts.
It is easy to show that in our model the ine±ciency of the equilibrium PRM strategy
comes from the spatial externality among farmers. If pests are immobile from one farm
to the next, formally if ±k = 0 for k 6= 0, then (2) simpli¯es to wi = °xi and, therefore,
@wj
@xi = 0. Substituting in (3) and (4) leads to the same ¯rst order conditions for the
optimal and equilibrium PRM strategies. Therefore if pests are immobile the PRM
strategies selected by pro¯t maximizer farmers are optimal.
In what follows, we compare the e±cient and equilibrium PRM strategies under
several assumptions on pest mobility and on the heterogeneity of pest attack intensity
among farmers. Whenever the equilibrium is not optimal, we assess the performance
of two regulations, a uniform mandatory refuge and a tax on the pesticide variety.
With a (uniform mandatory) refuge, each farmer is allowed to plant at most a given
proportion, let's say x, of his area with the pesticide variety. Producer i then chooses
xi to maximize ¼i(xi;wi;ni;c) subject to xi 2 [0;x]. A tax ¿ on pesticide increases
the over-cost of the pesticide seed from c to c + ¿. Therefore, farmer i chooses xi to
maximize ¼i(xi;wi;ni;c+¿) subject to xi 2 [0;1]. In the next two sections we explicitly
formulate x¤ and xe and analyze whether one or both instruments allow for e±ciency to
be restored, for extreme assumptions on pest dispersal rates and heterogeneity of pest
attacks.
84 Perfectly mobile pests
We consider here the extreme case where pest dispersal is uniform: resistance develop-
ment is determined by decisions made on all farms, no matter where they are located in
relation to one another. Formally, we assume ±k = 1 for every distance k. All farmers












The ¯rst-order condition of the e±cient PRM strategy (3) becomes:
ni(1 ¡ w¤) + ¸¤






j + ¹ ¸¤
i; (5)
whereas the ¯rst-order condition of the equilibrium PRM strategy (4) yields:
ni(1 ¡ we) + ¸e




i + ¹ ¸e
i: (6)
The next proposition describes and compares the e±cient and equilibrium PRM strate-
gies. It highlights the ine±ciency of the \laisser faire" PRM strategy in this case.
Proposition 1 With perfectly mobile pests, the e±cient PRM strategy requires that
farmers facing pest attacks up to a threshold n¤ plant only the conventional variety
while those facing pest attacks higher than n¤ plant only the pesticide variety. In equi-
librium PRM, farmers facing pest attacks lower than a threshold ne
1 < n¤ plant only the
conventional variety. Depending on the model parameter values, those with pest attacks
higher than ne
1 either all plant both varieties, or plant both varieties up to a threshold
ne
2 > ne
1 , while those with attacks higher than ne
2 plant only the pesticide variety.
The thresholds n¤ and ne





2 and the proofs are found in the Appendix.
With perfectly mobile pests, distances between farmers do not matter; only pest at-
tack intensities nj and farmers' planting strategies do. There is no cost of concentrating
the pesticide variety in one area and the conventional variety in another. The pesticide
variety is thus optimally planted where pest attacks are the highest. Since vulnerability
to pests increases as one moves along the two halves of the circle of farmers, the optimal
PRM strategy divides farmers into two neighboring groups: those more vulnerable to
pests, who should plant only the pesticide variety, and the others who should rely on
the conventional one.
9In the \laisser faire" equilibrium also, farmers who use the pesticide seed are those
more vulnerable to pests. Among them, some create a refuge zone to reduce resistance
in their own ¯elds because their own PRM strategy impacts the level of pest resistance
on their own ¯elds. Due to the open-access nature of pest resistance as a common-pool
resource, the pesticide variety is overused in equilibrium: farmers whose pest attacks
range between ne
1 and n¤ plant the pesticide variety while it is e±cient for them to plant
only the conventional one.
We now examine whether the optimal PRM strategy may be implemented with
regulation. A uniform mandatory refuge would never lead to the optimum, because it
would force all farmers planting the pesticide variety to plant at least the mandatory
refuge with the conventional variety, while the optimal PRM strategy requires that
farmers specialize in pesticide or conventional variety.5 A tax on the pesticide seed
¿ > 0 increases the overcost of the pesticide variety from c to c + ¿. The tax level
may be chosen so as to provide incentives to farmers with pest attacks ni 2 [ne
1;n¤] to
turn to the conventional variety. Yet as long as farmers internalize the impact of their
variety choice on pest resistance in their own ¯elds, they will devote part of their ¯elds
to the conventional variety. Therefore, the tax may implement the ¯rst-best only if each
farmer plants only one of the two varieties. This happens if all farmers consider that
their own variety choice has an in¯nitesimal impact on pest resistance. There could be
two reasons for that: either the number of farmers N is very large, i.e. ni
N tends to 0;
or farmers are \myopic" (in the sense that they ignore their impact on resistance when
they choose their plant varieties). We now examine these two cases in more detail.
In both cases, pro¯ts ¼i being linear in xi for every i, each farmer i compares the
return on pesticide variety, 1 ¡ niwe ¡ c (with the equilibrium level of resistance we),
with the return of the conventional variety, 1¡ni. Hence, farmers with low pest attacks
ni < ne
1 ´ c
1¡we plant only the conventional variety (formally for those farmers xe
i = 0),
and those with ni > ne plant only the pesticide variety (i.e. xe
i = 1). Therefore, as
with the optimal PRM strategy, the equilibrium threshold ne
1 divides each half circle
of farmers i = 1;:::;I between those whose pest attacks are lower than ne
1 (who plant
only the conventional variety) and the others (who plant only the pesticide variety).
No farmer creates a refuge, but still, the area including farmers with pest attacks lower
than ne
1 acts as a refuge area for the other farmers. It reduces resistance no matter
where farms are located, given that pests are perfectly mobile. But in this laissez-faire
equilibrium, farmers do not internalize their impact on resistance when they plant the
5Note that the optimal PRM strategy could be implemented by a "command-and-control" regulation
di®erent from mandatory refuges, by forcing farmers with ni · n
¤ to plant only the conventional variety.
But this would require the inference of pest attack intensities ni for every i 2 ­ which is likely to be
farmers' private information.
10pesticide variety, and therefore they rely too much on it. More precisely, all farmers
with pest attacks ni between ne
1 and n¤ plant only the pesticide variety whereas they
should plant the conventional one. By increasing the pesticide variety overcost from c
to c + ¿, a tax ¿ switches the threshold pest attack sensitivity to ne(¿) ´ c+¿
1¡we(¿) . As
¿ increases, ne(¿) increases since more farmers switch to the conventional variety. The
optimal PRM strategy is implemented with a tax ¿¤ so that ne(¿¤) = n¤ ´ c
1¡2w¤ and
we(¿¤) = w¤ which leads to ¿¤ = n¤w¤. Therefore, we have established the following
result.
Proposition 2 When pests are perfectly mobile, if each farmer has a negligible impact
on resistance, or if each farmer ignores his own impact on resistance development, farm-
ers facing pest attacks up to ne
1 plant the conventional variety whereas those facing pest
attacks higher than ne
1 plant the pesticide variety. E±ciency can be restored with a tax
on the pesticide variety ¿ = n¤w¤ where w¤ =
P
j2­;nj¸n¤ nj, which induces farmers
facing pest attacks ne
1 up to n¤ to turn to the conventional variety. Uniform refuge zones
do not allow for e±ciency to be restored.
The equilibrium PRM strategy is ine±cient because a farmer who plants the pesticide
variety does not bear the full cost of the development of resistance resulting from his
planting. A tax on the pesticide variety increases the over-cost of planting this variety.
The proposed tax ¿¤ equalizes this over-cost to the aggregate losses resulting from the
increase of resistance development for the farmer facing the threshold level of attacks
n¤. As long as farmers consider that they have no impact on resistance development,
this tax provides them with an incentive to select seed varieties e±ciently, and yields an
e±cient resistance level.
5 Imperfectly mobile pests with homogeneous pest attacks
Having examined the two extreme assumptions of the absence of pest mobility and
of perfect pest mobility, we now turn to the more realistic but complex assumption
of imperfect pest mobility across farms. To obtain tractable results, we simplify the
analysis by assuming homogeneous vulnerability to pests. Formally, we assume that
±k > ±k+1 for every k but ni = ni+1 = n for every i 2 ­. In this case of imperfect










j2­ ±i¡j. Therefore, the marginal impact of any farmer j on pest resistance
wi at location i is @wi
@xj =
°
K±i¡j. It is decreasing with the distance ji ¡ jj between i's
and j's ¯elds.










j + ¹ ¸¤
i;
which, using the de¯nition of wi in (7), simpli¯es to
n(1 ¡ w¤
i) + ¸¤
i = c + nw¤
i + ¹ ¸¤
i: (8)
The second-order condition which ensures that the optimal PRM strategy x¤ is unique,
implies that the optimal variety choices x¤
i must be the same around the circle.6 This
implies that pest resistance w¤
i will be the same everywhere. As before, corner solutions
may occur. On the one hand, no pesticide seed is planted if n · c since the loss due
to pest attacks does not compensate for the overcost of the pesticide variety. On the
other hand, it is optimal not to plant any conventional variety if n(1 ¡ 2°) ¸ c. An
interior solution occurs if n(1¡2°) < c < n, as none of the constraints is binding in that






. Using (7), we compute the optimal
PRM strategy de¯ned by x¤







for every i 2 ­. It prescribes the
planting of a positive share of the ¯eld 1 ¡ x¤
i with the conventional variety to reduce
the development of resistance.
For the equilibrium PRM strategy, condition (4) yields:
n(1 ¡ we
i) + ¸e




i + ¹ ¸e
i: (9)
Here, each farmer considers only the impact
°
K±0 of his variety choice xe
i on his own
resistance wi, thereby ignoring the impacts
°
K±i¡j on all other farmers j 6= i's resistance
wj. For an equilibrium resistance we


















We now investigate whether the e±cient PRM strategy may be implemented in
equilibrium through regulation. First, a mandatory refuge regulation restores e±ciency.
Suppose that farmers are constrained to plant at most a proportion ¹ x = x¤ with the
pesticide variety. Expecting a resistance equilibrium level w¤, condition (10) shows that
6Otherwise, moving the localization of x
¤ by any positive number k < I to the left or to the right
along the circle would yield same total pro¯t and therefore would also be optimal.
12i would like to plant xe
i = maxf K
2°±0(1¡ c
n);1g > x¤ with the pesticide variety and thus
would reach the upper bound x¤. Second, a tax ¿ on the pesticide seed would increase
its opportunity cost from c to c + ¿. Therefore, assuming that no constraint is binding
(i.e. ¸e
i = ¹ ¸e













The tax level that restores e±ciency is such that xe
i = x¤ if we
i(¿) is replaced by w¤ in










It is strictly positive because K > ±0 and n > (1¡w¤)n ¸ c (the marginal bene¯t of the
pesticide variety exceeds its overcost). Note that it achieves xe
i = x¤ only if ±0
K 6= 0, i.e.
if each farmer has a non-negligible impact on resistance or if farmers are not myopic.
Otherwise, as with perfectly mobile pests, farmers plant only one variety on all their
land. With homogeneous farmers, as assumed, the equilibrium PRM strategy with a tax
leads them all to choose only the conventional or the pesticide variety. We have thus
established the following result.
Proposition 3 With imperfectly mobile pests and homogeneous farmers, equilibrium
refuge zones are sub-optimal. E±ciency can be restored by uniform mandatory refuges.
It can also be restored by a tax on the pesticide variety, unless each farmer's impact on
resistance is negligible, or each farmer ignores his own impact on resistance development.
6 Comparison of refuge and tax under alternative assump-
tions on pest mobility and heterogeneity of pest attacks
We now turn to the case where pest mobility is imperfect and where producers face het-
erogeneous pest attacks. Analytical analysis is not tractable then, and we use numerical
simulations to assess how pest mobility and producers' heterogeneity a®ect the e±ciency
of the two regulations. We assume that I = 3: four producers are located equidistantly
on a circle and face pest attacks ni with n1 · n2 · n3 and n2 = n4. We set ° = 0:8
and c = 0:1. We model pest dispersal by ±1 = h± and ±2 = (h±)2, and pest attacks by
n1 = 0:5(1¡hn); n2 = n4 = 0:5 and n3 = 0:5(1+hn), letting the parameters h± and hn
vary from 0 to 1 by range of 0.1. This parameterization encompasses the extreme cases
of immobile pests (h± = 0), perfect pest mobility (h± = 1), homogeneous pest attacks
13(hn = 0) and maximum heterogeneity (hn = 1). Letting h± increase between 0.1 and
0.9 simulates higher degrees of pest mobility, while letting hn increase between 0.1 and
0.9 simulates increasing degrees of heterogeneity.7 As hn and h± vary between 0 and
1, for each couple (hn;h±), we use numerical constrained optimization to determine the
optimum and the equilibria without regulation, with the optimal tax level and with the
optimal uniform refuge.
Table 1 below indicates which of the two instruments, tax or refuge, performs best
(if needed) depending on pest mobility h± and farmers' heterogeneity hn. The results
are divided into four quartiles depending on welfare di®erences.8
[Insert Table 1]
Consistent with our theoretical results, we ¯nd that both the tax and the refuge
allow the optimum to be implemented if producers are homogeneous (hn = 0). There
is no other simulation in which either the tax or the refuge implements the optimum.
Table 1 then illustrates the relative performance of the two instruments. As long as
pest dispersal and/or heterogeneity between farms remain small (more or less, above
the dotted line in Table 1), the two instruments perform very similarly. With low pest
mobility, farmers internalize a lot of their own e®ect on the evolution of resistance.
Consequently, not much regulation is warranted, and not much di®erence appears in the
pro¯ts obtained with the two instruments. With low heterogeneity between farms, the
tax and the refuge perform fairly similarly since they are equivalent with homogeneous
farmers.9 When either pest dispersal h± or heterogeneity between farms hn, or both,
become high, i.e. below the dotted line in Table 1, the gap in the performance between
the two instruments becomes signi¯cant. With high pest mobility, we ¯nd that the
tax dominates the refuge, a result that is in conformity with our theoretical ¯ndings
for perfect mobility. The results are less clear-cut for a high farm heterogeneity. With
low pest mobility and high farm heterogeneity, the refuge strategy dominates the tax
strategy.
7Our multiplication formulation of pest dispersal encompasses both extreme cases of pest immobility
(±1 = ±2 = 0) and perfect mobility (±1 = ±2 = 1) and re°ects the empirical observation that pest
dispersal decreases more than linearly with the distance. Our additive formulation of heterogeneity in
pest attacks yields the same di®erence between n2 and n3 as between n1 and n2, and models maximum
heterogeneity in a simple way (with hn = 1, we have n1 = 0, n2 = 0:5 and n3 = 1). For these reasons,
we use a di®erent formulation for pest dispersal and for heterogeneity of pest attacks. In the extreme
case where n1 = 0 and pests are immobile, we assume that farmer 1 grows only the conventional crop
without using equation 2 (formally, resistance at location 1 is unde¯ned).
8Note that when a tax is used, aggregate pro¯ts (the welfare) include the tax revenue, assumed to
be redistributed to producers in a lump-sum way. The welfare values are provided in the Appendix.
9Note that if farmers' impact on resistance is not nil , both regulations implement the ¯rst-best with
homogeneous farmers.
14Interestingly, the relative performance of the two instruments does not change mono-
tonically with pest dispersal or farm heterogeneity. For some values of the dispersal
parameter h±, the best regulatory instrument is the refuge, then the tax, then again the
refuge, as the heterogeneity of pest attacks hn increases. Symmetrically, for some val-
ues of the heterogeneity parameter hn, the best instrument is the tax, then the refuge,
then the tax, as pest dispersal h±, increases.10 This point is illustrated in Figure 1
(respectively Figure 2) in which we plot the welfare (aggregate producers' pro¯t) at
the optimum and equilibrium with each regulation as a function of farmers' heterogene-
ity hn ¯xing pest dispersal at h± = 0:4 (respectively pest dispersal h± ¯xing farmers'
heterogeneity at hn = 0:1).11
[Insert Figure 1 and 2]
It is also interesting to investigate how the results change if we assume that farmers
are \myopic" in the sense that they do not account for their own e®ect of resistance
development ¡ since this assumption is often retained in simulation models of pest
resistance management (e.g. Vacher et al., 2006). Table 2 below shows the relative
performance of the two instruments when farmers are myopic.
[Insert Table 2]
Results are much more clear-cut then. The refuge is more e±cient than the tax for
low and intermediate pest dispersal. On the other hand, the tax performs better than
the refuge for high pest dispersal. Also, with myopic farmers, the tax tends to dominate
more often since farmers respond less to tax incentives. The di®erence between Tables 1
and 2 suggests that we should be careful when comparing regulations with simulations
if we ignore the farmer's perception of his own choice on pest resistance. As long as
farmers have a non-in¯nitesimal impact on resistance at their own location ¡ either
because they are not too numerous, or because pest mobility is limited ¡ they are
not "resistance takers". We should take into account the strategic interactions among
them and therefore focus on the Nash equilibrium of the game, not the competitive
equilibrium.
Altogether, these simulations suggest that the important parameter for the choice
of regulatory instruments is pest mobility: the tax should be implemented with highly
10The welfare is around 2.4 in the collective optimum, and the maximum deviation from this optimum
is 0.015 in the graphs, therefore the refuge and the tax perform quite close to the social optimum.
11Note that the increase of welfare (total pro¯ts) at the optimum with pest dispersal and/or farmers'
heterogeneity is due the pesticide variety ¯x cost c. As heterogeneity and pest dispersal increase, less
farmers plant pesticide varieties but those who do plant a higher share, thereby minimizing ¯x total
costs.
15mobile pests, while mandatory refuges are better adapted for less mobile pests, even
with high farm heterogeneity.
7 Conclusion
How should pest resistance to pesticide seeds be regulated? The paper illustrates the
trade-o® between a \command-and-control" instrument, which imposes the localization
of resource uses and/or externalities, and a \market-based instrument" which delegates
this choice to the agents (here, farmers). It highlights that the choice of regulatory in-
struments depends on pest mobility and on the heterogeneity of farmers' vulnerability to
pests. We provide analytical and simulation insights on this choice using a stylized model
where the latter features are two parameters. We ¯nd that the ¯rst-best pest resistance
management can be achieved (i) with a tax on pesticide seeds if pests move uniformly
across ¯elds and each farmer has a negligible impact on resistance development; (ii) with
a mandatory refuge or a tax on pesticide seeds if farmers are homogeneous ¡ provided
that each farmer has a non-negligible impact on resistance in his own ¯eld for the tax. In
the more general case of heterogeneous farmers and non-uniform (or imperfect) pest mo-
bility, we compare the performance of the two instruments on welfare using simulations
in an example. We ¯nd that neither instrument can restore e±ciency, and that their
relative performances di®er signi¯cantly if either pest mobility or farmers' heterogeneity
is high. As long as pests are highly mobile across ¯elds, the tax dominates the refuge.
However, if pest mobility is more geographically restricted but farmers' heterogeneity is
high, the refuge dominates.
Environmental economists like market-based instruments such as taxes (or tradable
permits or quotas) because market forces lead to an e±cient assignment of the burden
of resource use, or pollution reduction, among agents. Therefore, market-based instru-
ments tend to minimize the costs to reduce resource use or pollution when those costs
are agents' private information. This paper shows that when localization matters, those
who reduce resource use or pollution are not always located in the right place. Hence,
minimizing the cost of reducing resource use (or pollution) does not necessarily imply
an e±cient localization of this reduction and, therefore, does not lead to the ¯rst-best.
The performance of each instrument type (market-based or command-and-control) in
implementing a second-best solution depends on the relative importance of two sources
of e±ciency gain. Market-based instruments are good at minimizing the opportunity
costs of reducing resource use (or pollution), while command-and-control instruments
are good at localizing resource use (or pollution) e±ciently. In our set-up, the more
pests move across heterogeneous farms, the higher the gains from minimizing pollution
16(or resource use) reduction costs will be. On the other hand, if pest move less, their
spatial localization has a higher impact on the welfare and the command-and-control
instruments consequently dominate.
Another line of research would be to design a regulatory instrument to improve ef-
¯ciency compared to the tax alone or the refuge alone options, when pest mobility is
non-uniform and farmers are heterogeneous (as the refuge and tax both fail to imple-
ment the ¯rst-best in this case). A solution could be a market-based instrument with
a spatial component. In the ¯eld of biodiversity protection, one such instrument is
an agglomeration bonus which subsidizes contiguous conservation lands and therefore
increases the value of private land if protected areas are agglomerated (Parkhurst and
Shogren, 2005). Another is a tradable market for mandatory forest areas on agricultural
land, which Chomitz (2004) analyses under several assumptions on the territorial size
of the market in Brazil. In both cases a spatial dimension (the bonus or the territorial
size) is added to the market-based instrument (private property for land or tradable
mandatory forest areas) in order to favor the concentration of protected biodiversity ar-
eas. In contrast, for pest resistance management, regulation should favor the break-up
and dispersion of refuge areas.
17A Proof of Proposition 1






i 2 ­, the ¯rst order condition (5) may be written:
ni(1 ¡ w¤) + ¸¤
i = c + niw¤ + ¹ ¸¤
i; (11)
De¯ne n¤ ´ c
1¡2w¤. If the lower bound constraint xi ¸ 0 is binding, then ¸¤
i > 0, x¤
i = 0
and ¹ ¸i = 0 which, combined with (11), imply that ni < n¤. Symmetrically, if the upper
bound constraint is binding, then ¸¤
i = 0, ¹ ¸i > 0 and x¤
i = 1 and, thus, ni > n¤.
Second, we examine the equilibrium PRM strategy xe. De¯ne ¢ = (1¡we)2 ¡4
°c
N .
In (6), if the lower bound constraint xi ¸ 0 is binding, then ¸e
i > 0, xe
i = 0 and ¹ ¸e
i = 0,
which implies that ni < c
1¡we ´ ne
1. If the upper bound xi · 1 is binding, then ¸e
i = 0,
¹ ¸e
i > 0 and xe
i = 1, which implies that
°
Nn2
i ¡ ni(1 ¡ we) + c < 0 (inequality A).
If ¢ · 0, inequality A never holds, therefore there is no farmer with xe
i = 1.




















Assuming that ¢ > 0, one easily checks that nI < ne
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() condition A holds. Therefore if ¢ > 0 and
if condition A holds, there is no farmer i with xe
i = 1 (farmers with xe
i = 1 should be
such that ni 2 (ne
2;ne
3), but nI < ne
2).
Assuming that ¢ > 0, one easily checks that ne




N ¡ (1 ¡ w)
which implies that 1 ¡ w <
°nI
N + c
nI (inequality B). But if ne
3 < nI then inequality A
does not hold for nI, therefore necessarily xe
I < 1 and ¸e
I = 0. From the Lagrangean (6)
this implies nI(1 ¡ we) < c +
°n2
I
N which contradicts inequality B. Therefore we cannot
have that ne
3 < nI.
From (6), the proportion of pesticide variety for a farmer planting both varieties is




. Assuming that farmers i and i+1 plant both varieties, we
obtain that xi+1¡xi is of the sign of c(ni+ni+1)¡(1¡we)nini+1, which is indeterminate.
Third, we show n¤ > ne







1 nj. Therefore, from the above de¯nitions
of w¤ and we, w¤ ¸ we. Second, by de¯nition, it is equivalent to c
1¡2w¤ · c
1¡we, which
implies w¤ < we. Thus the starting assumption n¤ · ne
1 leads to two contradictory
consequences, namely w¤ ¸ we and w¤ < we, which shows that the reverse assumption
must hold. The proof is similar in the case where ¢ · 0, or in the case where ¢ > 0
and condition A does not hold.
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20Table 1. Simulation results: which regulation performs best? 
 
0  0  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  1  hδ
0 no  Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt  
0.1  no T R R R R R T  T*  T*  T**  
0.2 no  T  T  R  R  R  T  T*  T**  T**  T***  
0.3 no T*  T  R R* R  T*  T**  T**  T***  T***  
0.4 no T* T*  T  T  T*  T**  T*** T*** T***  T***  
0.5 no  T  T* T*  T**  T**  T*** T*** T*** T***  T***  
0.6 no  R  T T**  T**  T*** T*** T*** T*** T***  T***  
0.7 no  R  T* R*  R**  R**  R* R*  T**  T**  T***  
0.8 no R* R* R*  R**  R**  R*  T T**  T***  T***  
0.9 no  R  R*  R**  R**  R**  R* T*  T**  T***  T***  
1 no R R*  R**  R**  R**  R*  T*  T**  T***  T***   
hn             
 
 
Note: This table provides simulation results with hδ in columns and hn in lines. It indicates one 
of four possible situations: no regulation is warranted ("no"); each of the two instruments, tax 
or refuge, may restore the optimum ("Popt"); a tax does better than a refuge, but does not 
restore the optimum ("T"); a refuge does better than a tax, but does not restore the optimum 
("R"). Results for situations T and R are divided in four quartiles, depending on the absolute 
value of the difference in aggregate producers' profits with the optimal tax and the optimal 
refuge. The 25 simulations with the lowest difference in aggregate profits with these two 
instruments are indicated with no star, the 25 simulations with an intermediate low difference 
with one star, the 25 simulations with an intermediate high difference with two stars, and the 
5 simulations with the highest difference in profits with three stars.   2  
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  22Figure 2. Aggregate welfare as a function of h , for a given h δ n
 



























  23Table 2. Simulation results: which regulation performs best if farmers are myopic? 
 
0  0  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  1  hδ
0 Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt Popt  
0.1  R R R R R R  R*  R*  R*  R T   
0.2  R  R*  R*  R* R** R* R** R*  R  T  T*   
0.3  R*  R** R** R** R** R**  R*  R*  T  T*  T*   
0.4  R*** R**  R**  R** R*** R**  R*  R  T  T*  T**   
0.5  R**  R**  R*** R*** R*** R**  R*  R  T*  T*  T***   
0.6  R**  R**  R*** R*** R*** R**  R*  T  T*  T**  T**   
0.7  R**  R**  R*** R*** R*** R*** R**  R*  R  T*  T*   
0.8  R**  R*** R*** R*** R*** R*** R**  R*  T  T*  T**   
0.9  R*** R*** R*** R*** R*** R*** R**  R*  T  T*  T**   
1  R*** R*** R*** R*** R*** R*** R**  R*  T  T*  T**   
hn             
 
Note: same as in Table 1. 
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